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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the People’s Republic China (“PRC” or China) 
as a global economic power and an attractive destination for 
multinational companies (“MNCs”) to set up business 
operations through foreign direct investment has led to a host 
of new challenges and risks for MNCs. This Article focuses on 
the risks that arise under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
(“FCPA”),1 which applies with special force to China due to the 
coalescence of several factors: China’s state-controlled economy, 
a pervasive business culture in which gifts and favors are 

 On January 29, 2014, Fordham Law School and the Chinese Business Lawyers 
Association jointly hosted a panel titled “China and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Challenges for the 21st Century.” This Article was prepared for Professor Chow’s 
presentation at the panel. For more information on the panel, visit http://
law.fordham.edu/newsroom/32206.htm. 
 Joseph S. Platt-Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Professor of Law, the Ohio State 
University Michael E. Moritz College of Law. This Article develops themes first 
explored in Daniel C.K. Chow, China under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 WIS. L. 
REVIEW 574 (2012). 
1. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). 
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expected, and in which various forms of petty corruption are 
common and tolerated. 
The FCPA prohibits US companies from corruptly giving 
bribes or “anything of value” to “foreign officials” for the 
purpose of obtaining or retaining business.2 There are three 
elements under the statute that create special concerns for 
MNCs doing business in China: (1) “foreign official”; (2) 
“anything of value”; and (3) the use of third parties, including 
parties that make pass-through payments to a foreign official.3 
Each of these elements, and examples of the risks involved, are 
discussed below. 
I. “FOREIGN OFFICIAL” 
A foreign official is defined under the FCPA as “(1) an 
employee of a government or instrumentality thereof; and (2) 
any person acting in an official capacity on behalf of a foreign 
government.”4 In the case of China, this element applies with 
special force due to the dominance of the economy by state-
owned enterprises (“SOEs”). SOEs are “business entities 
established by central and local governments and whose 
supervisory officials are from the government.”5 SOEs dominate 
in all core sectors of the PRC economy, such as oil and gas 
refining and exploration; banking and finance, rail and air 
transport, steel and metals production, electricity and water 
supply, and telecommunications.6 China has a long term 
national strategic goal of creating SOEs that are “national 
champions,” which can compete with the most successful MNCs 
in the global economy.7 At the conclusion of the Third Plenum 

2. See 15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2012). 
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1(3), 78dd-2(3), 78dd-3(3). 
4. See 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(f). 
5. See OECD Working Grp. on Privatisation & Corporate Governance of State 
Owned Assets, State-Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence 3 (Jan. 26, 
2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-owned
enterprises/42095493.pdf. 
6. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
25 (West 2d ed. 2009). 
7. See US Int’l Trade Comm’n, China: Intellectual Property Infringement, 
Indigenous Innovation Policies, and Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. 
Economy 5–6, Investigation No. 332-514, USITC Publication 4199 (amended) (Nov. 
10), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf. 
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of the Communist Party in November 2013, the Party firmly 
reiterated this policy by pledging to “incessantly strengthen” the 
“vitality” of SOEs.8 
The US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has indicated that 
SOEs qualify as an “instrumentality” of a government9 and that 
an employee of an SOE qualifies as a government official.10 The 
DOJ states that the FCPA covers “payments to low-ranking 
employees and high-level officials alike.”11 Given the dominate 
role of SOEs in China’s economy and the DOJ’s interpretations 
of the FCPA, some US companies feel compelled to take the 
position that “everyone they deal with is a ‘foreign official’ 
because they work for an SOE.”12 
These elements of the FCPA, combined with China’s state-
dominated economy, can give rise to many scenarios on a daily 
basis that could be potential FCPA violations. For example, 
suppose that an MNC sets up a business entity in China, a wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise (“WFOE”) or a joint venture, as 
required by Chinese law.13 The WFOE is a Chinese legal entity 
that is wholly owned by the MNC while the joint venture is a 
Chinese legal entity that is owned by the MNC and a local 
partner, often an SOE.14 Suppose that the MNC is in the 
business of manufacturing and selling chemicals and that many 
customers of the products are SOEs. A sales agent in the MNC 
might approach a purchasing agent, a low ranking employee, in 
the SOE and offer a kickback or a bribe if the purchasing agent 
places a purchase order with the MNC. The sales agent in the 
MNC’s China business entity knows that it makes no difference 
to the SOE whether the agent places an order with any 

8. See Bob Davis & Brian Spegele, State Companies Emerge as Winners Following Top 
China Meeting, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702303559504579195551704526972. 
9. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 20–21 (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter FCPA Resource 
Guide], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
10. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 20. 
11. See FCPA Recourse Guide, supra note 9, at 20. 
12. See Declaration of Prof. Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss Counts One through Ten of the Indictment ¶ 447, United States v. Carson, 
No. SACR 09-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011). 
13. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 489–90 (2d ed. 2010). 
14. See id. 
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particular supplier and the purchasing agent may be indifferent 
between various suppliers since the agent is paid a fixed salary. 
The sales agent offers a kickback, paid to the personal account 
of the purchasing agent, in order to induce the purchasing 
agent to place a purchase order with the WFOE. These types of 
kickbacks are common in China’s current business culture and 
occur innumerable times on a daily basis.15 Many SOEs engage 
in such tactics and most people in China are resigned to accept 
petty corruption as a common method of doing business. 
However, although these may be common practices and 
tolerated in China, the transaction might trigger liability under 
the FCPA. Although the purchasing agent is a low ranking 
employee in the SOE, the agent might qualify as a foreign 
official and the kickback might qualify as a bribe given to a 
foreign official for the purpose of obtaining business. The 
kickback could constitute a violation of the FCPA. 
Under these definitions, a doctor or administrator at 
China’s state-operated hospitals could qualify as a “foreign 
official.” If the China business entity of an MNC gives a kickback 
to a doctor to induce the doctor to prescribe a medication, then 
this transaction could also trigger liability under the FCPA. It is 
common knowledge in China that doctors in state-operated 
hospitals receive kickbacks for prescribing medications.16 
Recently, China has begun to crackdown on this practice in 
several high profile cases, including a current investigation of 
Glaxo Smith Kline, as well as sixty other pharmaceutical 
companies, for giving kickbacks funneled through travel 
agencies.17 
II. “ANYTHING OF VALUE” 
The FCPA proscribes the giving of “anything of value” to a 
foreign official in order to obtain or retain business so the gift 
does not have to be cash. The DOJ has interpreted the term 

15. This observation is based upon the Author’s own experience working as an in-
house counsel at a multinational company with substantial business operations in 
China and on the author’s recent discussions with lawyers and academics in China. 
16. This observation is based on the Author’s own experience. 
17. See Mark Thompson, China Says GalxoSmithKline Ran a Huge Bribery Web, CNN 
MONEY (July 15, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/15/news/
companies/glaxosmithkline-china-bribery. 
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“anything of value” in an expansive manner. For example, 
paying for executive training programs at US universities for 
Chinese foreign officials when the training was not specifically 
related to the company’s business could fall under this 
definition.18 Other examples include payment of tuition and 
expenses for education programs in the United States for 
Chinese officials, payment of tuition for an MBA degree, 
arranging for a paid internship for a daughter of a Chinese 
official, and payment for sightseeing trips in the United States to 
tourist attractions such as the Grand Canyon and Las Vegas.19 
The issue that is raised by this expansive definition is that 
Chinese government or business officials often ask for non-
monetary favors from friends and other business associates. 
Asking for favors, such as helping a child or a relative, is a 
common practice in China and most people in China not only 
accept the practice but see nothing wrong with the practice. 
However, such a practice could give trigger liability under the 
FCPA, especially where there is a quid pro quo, i.e. the 
obtaining of business in return for a non-monetary favor given 
to a Chinese official. 
As an example of how this element may affect MNCs doing 
business in China, suppose that an MNC believes that some of its 
products have been pirated by counterfeiters and infringers. 
The MNC’s China business entity approaches a government 
administrative agency to enforce its intellectual property rights, 
but an official in the agency states that it is necessary to have the 
knock-offs tested by a technical consulting company to certify 
that the products are knocks-offs and are of low quality. The 
official suggests to employees at the MNC’s China business entity 
that they use a particular company owned by a relative and pay a 
fee for the service to the relative’s company. The employees at 
the China business entity know that if they use the company 
owned by a relative of the official, the company will issue the 
certification for a fee and the enforcement action can proceed. 

18. See Complaint ¶¶ 16–18, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. CV 09-6094 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp
2157.pdf. 
19. See Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. Lucent Technology Inc., No. 1:04-cv-0114 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 21, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp
20414.pdf. 
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The employees also know that if they do not use the company, 
the enforcement action will be stalled, perhaps indefinitely. If 
the MNC uses the company, the official receives no direct and 
immediate monetary benefit from helping out a relative, but this 
arrangement might be deemed to be giving something of value 
to a foreign official. This scenario above is also common in 
China. MNCs need to obtain approvals or the cooperation of 
government officials on a regular basis and the officials might 
condition approval on the use of a company or business owned 
by a relative or friend. Liability under this element of the FCPA 
is also squarely raised in the recent and on-going FCPA 
investigation of hiring by JPMorgan and other banks of well-
connected children of Chinese government officials in return 
for business opportunities from China’s state-owned 
enterprises.20 
III. THIRD PARTIES AND INTERMEDIARIES 
Many MNCs need to engage with third parties on a regular 
basis as part of their business operations in China. The use of 
third parties by the MNCs raises additional issues under the 
FCPA as the following illustrations demonstrate. 
A. Third Parties as Business Partners 
Returning to our discussion of foreign direct investment, 
suppose that the MNC decides to establish a joint venture in 
China with a state-owned enterprise as the local partner. The 
joint venture is a separate legal entity under Chinese law that is 
owned by the MNC and its local partner in direct proportion to 
the capital contributions of each party.21 The joint venture 
manufactures industrial products and equipment and sells its 
products to government bureaus and SOEs. Prior to forming the 
joint venture with the MNC, the SOE local partner had been 
giving kickbacks to officials in government bureaus and other 

20. See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, On Defensive, JPMorgan Hired 
China’s Elite, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
12/29/on-defensive-jpmorgan-hired-chinas-elite/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
21. See Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures arts. 17, 18 (promulgated and effective July 22, 2001); see also DANIEL 
C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 88–89 (2012). 
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SOEs in order to complete sales. After forming the joint 
venture, the employees of the joint venture from the local 
partner SOE continue to give kickbacks to officials from the 
government bureaus and other SOEs to induce them to 
purchase the joint venture’s products. The kickbacks are 
attributable to the joint venture and the actions of the joint 
venture are attributable as an agent to the MNC under the 
FCPA.22 Based on similar facts, the DOJ sought to prosecute RAE 
Systems, a Delaware Corporation with its headquarters in 
California, for the actions of its majority-owned joint ventures in 
China.23 The DOJ and RAE ultimately reached a settlement in 
this case.24 
B. Third Parties as Contractors 
A second common scenario is the use by the MNC’s China 
business entities of third party service providers, such as law 
firms, private investigation companies, and various consulting 
firms that might make illegal pass-through payments to foreign 
officials on behalf of the MNC.25 For example, many MNCs use 
private investigation firms in tracking down counterfeiters and 
infringers of their products.26 Investigation work is time 
consuming and could be dangerous as the private investigators 
need to assume false identities in order to penetrate the 
counterfeiting ring. When the counterfeiting operation has 
been identified, representatives of the MNC’s China business 
entity, along with the private investigators, will approach the 
PRC enforcement authorities for an enforcement action, often 
in the form of a surprise raid and seizure. It is well-known in 
China that private investigation firms often make payments of 

22. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any issuer . . . 
or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer . . . .” to pay bribes to 
foreign officials). 
23. See Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Carolos F. Ortiz & Roy K. 
McDonald, attorneys for RAE Systems Inc. 1 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at 
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/rae-systems/12-10-10rae-systems.pdf-2001-
02-16-Text Version (non-prosecution agreement). 
24. See id. 
25. Such pass-through payments are unlawful under the FCPA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78dd-1(3), 78dd-2(3), 78dd-3(d). 
26. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multinational Companies in 
China, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 763-64 (2010). 
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“case fees” to induce PRC officials to conduct enforcement 
actions.27 The case fees are demanded by officials because they 
argue that the fees are necessary to compensate them for the use 
of many officers, vehicles, and for the storage and destruction of 
the counterfeits. If the enforcement action involves travel to an 
out of town location, the officials may demand reimbursement 
of travel expenses, lodging, and meals. If the MNC seeks to 
pursue a criminal case against counterfeiters, the MNC will need 
to approach the Public Security Bureau (the Police), which may 
not only ask for a “case fee” but also for a “reward” for each 
arrest of a suspected counterfeiter.28 The private investigation 
companies pay these cases fees and other expenses and then bill 
the MNC’s China business entity for these fees under the 
category of miscellaneous expenses. In a large enforcement 
action, involving travel, these fees can be in the tens or 
hundreds of thousand dollars. Many MNCs conduct raids on a 
weekly basis. 
The FCPA contains a provision that attributes liability to a 
US company if it makes a payment to a third party if the MNC 
knows or should have known that the payment will be passed 
through to foreign officials.29 The DOJ might take a dim view of 
an MNC that allows third party contractors to pass through 
payments in the tens or hundreds of thousands of US dollars to 
PRC officials in order to obtain enforcement actions that such 
officials might otherwise not conduct.30 
CONCLUSION 
MNCs doing business in China face many challenges under 
the FCPA that could create traps for the unwary. As the 
discussion above illustrates, the FCPA applies with special force 

27. This observation is based upon the Author’s own experience as an in-house 
counsel for an MNC with substantial business operations in China. 
28. The Author was present at a meeting with the Public Security Bureau when 
this request was made. 
29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(3), 78dd-2(3), 78dd-3(d). 
30. The FCPA contains a so-called “grease payment” exception for payments to 
government officials to facilitate any routine government action. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
1(b), §78dd-2(b), §78dd-3(b). Routine government action refers to obtaining permits, 
processing papers, such as visas, providing phone, power, and water supply. See, e.g., 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(h). Paying tens of thousands of dollars to obtain an enforcement 
action might not fall under this definition. 
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to China because of China’s state-dominated economy, a 
business culture in which favors and gifts are expected, and in 
which petty corruption is common and tolerated. In addition, 
China has recently begun a crackdown on commercial bribery 
by MNCs.31 This crackdown could ensnare many MNCs doing 
business in China and bring to light various clandestine bribery 
schemes that might also run afoul of the FCPA. This recent 
development creates an even greater incentive for MNCs to be 
diligent and invest in strong compliance programs so that they 
do not run afoul of the FCPA. 
  

31. See Yin Pumin, Clamping Down on Corporate Bribery, BEIJING REV. (July 30, 
2013), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txt/2013-07/29/content_557941.htm. 
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